AlphaIQ Chile Economy ABM — the 45% debt line, the structural-balance rule and copper

Chile 2026–2050: the 45% debt line, the structural-balance rule, the copper ratchet, the BBB band, learning bondholders and the 2030 vote

Ranks scenarios, not a forecast

v0.2 · validation 50/52

Scenario

October 2026 as it stands: the government closes 40–100% of the gap between Dipres's projected structural balance and the targets (−1.8 to −1.4% of GDP, 2027–31); a 35% chance the March-2030 government lets the rule slip; copper at US$6.72/lb reverting to the US$5.37 reference price.

Monte Carlo paths1,000

Paired seeding, as in the Python model of record: path k has the same seed in every scenario, so comparisons are paired and the dashboard reproduces the validation run digit for digit at the same seed and path count.

Horizon97q → 2050

Learning bondholders

Investors switch between value and trend-following rules; the spread can overshoot, and a large mispricing brings value investors back.

Switching rule

How quickly bondholders switch rules1.00

How strongly a large mispricing brings value investors back1.5

How hard trend-followers chase the last move0.40

How hard value investors pull the spread back0.175

Size of sentiment shocks0.116

2030 slip responds to the economy

Weak growth, high inflation or rising unemployment in the year before the late-2029 vote make a slip more likely.

Both off reproduces the v0.1 model exactly. Defaults (Franke–Westerhoff herding and misalignment rule, design v1.1): β 1.00, mispricing pull 1.5, trend 0.40, pull-back 0.175, shocks 0.116 (fitted to Chile's EMBIG swings 1998–2024).

Share of the gap closed (low)40%

Share of the gap closed (high)100%

P(2030 government lets the rule slip)35%

Unfunded tax cut from 2029 (% of GDP)none

Structural target's response to debt after 20310.05

Dipres's structural-balance targets are −1.8, −1.7, −1.6, −1.5, −1.4% of GDP for 2027–31; its own projection without new measures is −1.8, −2.2, −2.5, −2.8, −2.0. Each path draws the share of that gap the government closes (Chile missed its target in 2023–25). The government that takes office in March 2030 may stop closing it.

Nothing has run yet. Read the page and set the scenario on the left, then press Run simulation: it runs the model in your browser.

Chile · exposure to the region

What reaches Chile, and what it sends

Open the cascade map →

Coming in · change in the odds of debt > 45% by 2030 (baseline 59.4%), regional model with links on

Copper falls 35%

copper revenue

+23.7 ± 1.3

China slows

copper and exports

+15.4 ± 1.1

US recession

sales to the US

+2.1 ± 0.5

Global sell-off

borrowing cost +2.16 pts

no clear change

Brazil quietly defaults

lenders, +0.21 pts

no clear change

Oil falls 40%

no link

no clear change

Argentina defaults

lenders, +0.11 pts

no clear change

Venezuela sanctions snap back

no link

no clear change

Going out

Downgrade to the BBB band

+0.006 pts

to every neighbour’s borrowing cost the next quarter (2% of its own +0.3 jump; ×5 in the stress case)

Currency moves with

Brazil 0.51 · Colombia 0.50 · Mexico 0.40

Copper price

Moves with oil (0.56); China is its main channel